南科大信管系樊潇帅在Production and Operations Management发表研究成果
近日，南方科技大学信息系统与管理工程系樊潇帅助理教授作为第一作者的论文“To Bribe or not to Bribe in a Procurement Auction under Disparate Corruption Pressure”在Production and Operations Management期刊发表。该文由樊潇帅助理教授与香港科技大学Ying-Ju Chen教授、加州大学洛杉矶分校 (UCLA) Christopher Tang教授合作撰写。
We examine a (large) manufacturer's bribery decision (to bribe or not to bribe) arising from a procurement auction under "disparate corruption pressure" when another (small) manufacturer is known to offer the auctioneer (i.e. the intermediary) a bribe in exchange for the "right of first refusal". We discover that the large manufacturer should refuse to pay bribes at all times in order to prevent from leaking its private cost information to the small manufacturer and prevent from intensifying the competition. However even when the large manufacturer is disadvantaged for refusing to bribe we show that it can benefit from this corrupted auction when the difference in production efficiency or the bribe is high so that the "positive force" (i.e. cost advantage) derived from the right of first refusal dominates the information disadvantage. Hence under a specific condition the large manufacturer has no incentive to expose the collusion between the intermediary and the corrupt manufacturer. Such a “silence tactic” provides a plausible explanation for the prevalence of corrupt auctions in practice.